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Bert Sacks September 28, 1999

 

 

 

Iraq: Unicef's Report and the US State Department's Report

Soon after Unicef issued its August 1999 report on child health in Iraq¹, the US State Department issued its own report², described in the press as "a counterattack." The US is counterattacking, to defend its policy of economic sanctions on Iraq against Unicef data of a doubling of child mortality and half a million children's deaths in Iraq. To this end, the US report makes one central claim: "Iraqi obstruction of the oil-for-food program, not United Nations sanctions, is the primary reason the Iraqi people are suffering."³

As evidence, the US report cites Unicef data of an improvement in child mortality rates in the northern Kurdish areas compared to worsening rates in the rest of the country. State Department spokesman, James Rubin says "It is our view that the fact that in northern Iraq the mortality rate is improving, with the same sanctions regime as the rest of Iraq, shows that in places where Saddam Hussein isn't manipulating the medicines and the supplies, this works. ... We can't solve a problem that is the result of tyrannical behavior by the regime in Baghdad."⁴ The US report concludes "... the government of Iraq does not share the international community's concern about the welfare of its people."⁵

On the same page, the US report has this plot of mortality rates for children under five years of age. The continually increasing mortality line is for Central/Southern Iraq.

Mortality rates according to US State Dept. Report, Sept. 1999⁶

 

 

Does the US State Department plot of child mortality accurately reflect the Unicef data?

Mortality rates according to Unicef Report, August 12, 1999⁷

 

From the Unicef plot, it is obvious that something happened in 1990 [the start of UN/US sanctions, followed by the Gulf war] to cause a marked change in the downward trend in the under-five mortality rate in Iraq. Gareth Jones, Unicef's chief statistician, writes "... if the substantial reduction in the under-five mortality rate during the 1980's had continued through the 1990's, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under-five in the country as a whole ...."⁸

The plot from the US State Department report gives the impression that child mortality for most of Iraq was continually increasing from 1984 to 1998, and that there was no change for the central-southern regions of Iraq due to the sanctions and the Gulf war. The Unicef chart shows that child mortality for all of Iraq was continually decreasing from 1980 to 1990 --- with a dramatic worsening occurring from 1990 to the present.

It is impossible to check the data from the US report. There are no footnotes and no references in the report. A possible source for the US plot is a bar graph⁹ in the Unicef report. It has four data points for child mortality, each covering a five-year period. If the first point is discarded, the remaining three could approximately fit the straight-line shown in the US report. If the first data point were included, it would show the tail end of four decades of improvement in the rates of child mortality in Iraq. The actual extent of the improvement over those four decades is shown in this Unicef table.¹⁰ It shows that during the years 1990-98, three decades of child-health improvements were wiped out.

	UNICEF Home | Information | Participation | Organization | Activities Child mortality: Iraq Current estimates The current estimates for under-5 and infant mortality rates (U5MR and IMR) in Iraq are given in the following table:
	Year	U5MR	IMR
	1960	171	117
	1970	127	90
	1980	83	63
	1990	50	40
	1995	117	98
	1998	125	103
	This page last updated on August 27, 1999. UNICEF Home | Information | Participation | Organization | Activities

Why would the US report discard the first data point and present a continually worsening health situation in Iraq, unaffected by the imposition of sanctions and the Gulf war? "When asked on `Meet the Press' last December if the United States bears any responsibility for the deaths of Iraqi children because of a lack of food and medicine, [Secretary of State] Albright said: `No, Saddam Hussein bears full responsibility for that. ... if the sanctions weren't in place, then he would be selling oil for tanks.'"¹¹

When sanctions weren't in place, the actual Unicef data from 1960 to 1990 shows a decline in Iraq's under-five mortality rate from 171 to 50. By "judiciously" selecting its data, the US report appears to show continuously worsening child health conditions all the way back to 1984, supporting Madeleine Albright's statement that Saddam Hussein "does not care a fig about his people."¹²

The Unicef data which contradicts this view --- and shows a three-fold improvement in child mortality over the years when sanctions weren't in place --- is simply ignored by the US State Department report and by Madeleine Albright. Yet it is obvious that a three-fold improvement in child mortality requires significant national effort. It is well known that, to achieve these results, Iraq cared for its children with large expenditures for hospitals, clinics, medical training, universally available health care, and public literacy programs.

On US claims that improvement in Kurdish areas proves manipulation

State Department spokesperson James Rubin says the difference in mortality rates between north vs. south-central Iraq --- with better rates in the north --- proves that the Iraqi regime is manipulating medicines and supplies for the areas they control.

On the release of the Unicef report, Unicef's Executive Director Carol Bellamy was asked about this difference. The Washington Post reported her response: "Bellamy attributed the discrepancy to the large amount of international aid pumped into northern Iraq at the end of the war. In contrast, humanitarian assistance began to reach central and southern Iraq only after April 1996, when Iraq agreed to the terms of the U.N.'s oil-for-food program."¹³

(It is interesting to note that The New York Times coverage of the same Unicef survey¹⁴ has only one quote in it. It is not the quote of Carol Bellamy, the Executive Director of Unicef, giving her understanding of the data being presented. It is only the quote from James Rubin, cited above, giving the US State Department's interpretation of the data.)

The US claims that "... we can't solve a problem that is the result of tyrannical behavior by the regime in Iraq." In the official UN news release of the Unicef report, Carol Bellamy says "the surveys' findings cannot be easily dismissed as an effort by Iraq to mobilize opposition to UN sanctions."¹⁵

In that same document, Ms. Bellamy calls for improvements from both the international community and Iraq. But then --- as if repeating her warning not to dismiss the Unicef findings --- she quotes this statement of the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues: "Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war."¹⁶

What do others say about US "proof" of Iraqi obstruction of aid?

Professor Richard Garfield of Columbia University observes "... the embargo in the North is not the "same embargo" as they [the US State Department] claim. The North enjoys porous borders with Turkey, Syria, and Iran, and thus is effectively less embargoed than the rest of the country. It benefits from the aid of 34 Non-Government Organizations, while in the whole rest of the country there are only 11. It receives 22% more per capita from the Oil for Food program, and gets about 10% of all UN-controlled assistance in currency, while the rest of the country receives only commodities....

"As one involved in providing assistance throughout Iraq, I must admit that the arbitrary, ineffective, or destructive control sometimes exercised by the Security Council over Iraqi funds for food and medicine seem no less tyrannical. A good faith effort to meet basic needs in Iraq would create a better basis to negotiate an end to the Iraq conflict. Instead, every problem is blamed on Saddam...."¹⁷

(As a footnote to Professor Garfield's last observation, the name "Saddam" is used 52 times in the 22-page report from the US State Department, including in the title "Saddam Hussein's Iraq." During President Clinton's 15-minute speech on December 15, 1998, explaining why the US had begun bombing Iraq again, he repeated "Saddam" 31 times.)

Holdbrook Arthur, the head of the World Food Program in Iraq, in 1996 said that the WFP was almost completely funded for the Kurdish north, but that it was very under-funded for the rest of the country. Mr. Arthur explained that countries could selectively donate aid to the northern region --- while providing none for the rest of the country.¹⁸

The WFP has confirmed this recently, saying "... from 1991 until the implementation of SCR 986, donors responded much more generously to WFP activities in the Kurdish north than in the center/south. We had significant shortfalls in resourcing for the component of our emergency operation in the center/south, whereas the components in the north were generally well-resourced."¹⁹ (The US is by far the major donor to the WFP.)

On US claim that Iraq obstructs aid from the UN oil-for-food program

The United Nations has "experts on the ground" whose primary job is to oversee the operation of the multi-billion-dollar UN programs in Iraq. What do these UN officials say about US claims that the Iraqi government withholds medicines as part of "cynical efforts to sacrifice the Iraqi people's welfare in order to bring an end to UN sanctions"?

Denis Halliday was UN Assistant Secretary General and head of the oil-for-food program, before resigning his career in protest over sanctions. He says: "For anyone to imply that the men and women of the Baghdad government, Ministry of Health in particular, deliberately withhold basic medicines from children in great need, is monstrous and says more about the unhealthy mind of the accusers than anything else."²⁰

Hans Sponeck is the current head of the UN oil-for-food program. Responding to claims (such as in the US State Department report) that the Iraqi government deliberately withholds medicines, he says: "It is not --- I repeat, it is not, and you can check this with my colleagues --- a premeditated act of withholding medicines from those who should have it. It is much, much more complex than that."²¹

US State Department claims of obstruction of UN aid are --- at their heart --- also attacks on the competence and integrity of the UN administrators of the programs. The US report should give reasons why it believes Mr. Halliday and Mr. Sponeck fail to substantiate US-claimed mismanagement. The US report should explain, as well, why the country heads of Unicef, the World Health Organization, and the World Food Program do not report what the US claims. Does the US believe all these officials are incompetent? Does the US believe they are all in collusion with the mismanagement? The US report provides no evidence on this question ... and does not quote a single UN official.

In meetings with the heads of these programs in Baghdad, members of medical, humanitarian and human-rights groups hear detailed reports from these top UN officials. They do not report the kind of gross negligence and/or deliberate obstruction which the US claims. These UN officials consistently report that the Iraqi regime is, by and large, doing its very best to administer a complex program under extremely difficult conditions.

What are the conditions under which the oil-for-food program operates?

In March 1991, the UN issued its first report on the damage in Iraq at the end of the Gulf war. While that report is from 1991, it needs to be repeated because it is a description of conditions which --- to a significant degree --- still exist in Iraq today.

The UN Ahtisaari Report begins: "I and the members of my mission were fully conversant with media reports regarding the situation in Iraq and, of course, with the recent WHO/UNICEF report on water, sanitary and health conditions in Greater Baghdad. It should be said at once, however, that nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology ...."²²

After detailing the impending humanitarian crisis, the report concludes as follows: "It will be difficult, if not impossible, to remedy these immediate humanitarian needs without dealing with the underlying need for energy, on an equally urgent basis. The need for energy means, initially, emergency oil imports and the rapid patching up of a limited refining and electricity production capacity, with essential supplies from other countries. Otherwise, food that is imported cannot be preserved and distributed; water cannot be purified; sewage cannot be conveyed away and cleansed; crops cannot be irrigated; medications cannot be conveyed where they are required; needs cannot even be effectively assessed. It is unmistakable that the Iraqi people may soon face a famine if massive aid life-supporting needs are not rapidly met. Time is short." (emphasis added)

In March 1991, the UN reported that most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous and that it is unmistakable that the Iraqi people may soon face a famine if massive aid life-supporting needs are not rapidly met. Eight years later this is still true. Today food and medicine still can't be preserved, water still can't be purified, sewage still can't be treated, and mal-nourishment is chronic. Repair of the civilian infrastructure --- particularly electrical generating plants and water- and sewage-processing plants --- has been estimated at $41 billion.²³

This estimate represents an investment of about $2,000 for every person in Iraq . Hans von Sponeck, in April 1999 said that the oil-for-food program provides him with $177 per person per year --- 50 cents a day --- for all of the needs of each Iraqi citizen. He said "Now I ask you, $180 per year? That's not a per capita income figure. That is a figure out of which everything has to be financed, from electrical services to water and sewage, to food, to health – the lot. ... that is obviously a totally, totally inadequate figure."²⁴

When asked in April if there was any possibility of funding the repair of the civilian infrastructure from the oil-for-food program, Mr. Sponeck replied "No, the money isn't there. ... I think it will take 10-plus years ... from the moment sanctions are dropped to a more normal situation."²⁵ On September 20^th, Mr. Sponeck (in remarks "intended at least in part as a reply to a State Department report issued last week") called for "an immediate and unconditional lifting of many sanctions" that would open the way to bigger flows of food, medicine and most other imports, he said, "to end a silent human tragedy."²⁶

On why we destroyed the infrastructure and why it hasn't been fixed

In 1991, the same article that covered the UN Ahtisaari Report in The New York Times, explains why the "massive aid" for Iraq called for was unlikely to happen --- and, in fact, has not happened to this day. The article explains that the US administration's view is that "... by making life uncomfortable for the Iraqi people it [sanctions] would eventually encourage them to remove President Saddam Hussein from power."²⁷

In March 1991, we said life would be "uncomfortable" for the Iraqi people. We said this was to "encourage" them to overthrow their leader. Because we couldn't say that our "encouragement" involved starvation and disease --- we had to ignore reports that said there was famine and epidemics in Iraq. In the climate following the Gulf war, virtually no US public figure dared to ask if this was a moral, or legal, or practical policy to adopt.

During the coming months, it became clear the extent of the civilian infrastructure that was deliberately destroyed. All 20 of Iraq's electrical generating plants were bombed, thereby denying the country electricity, water, and sewage processing. Without these means of modern life support, we also immediately denied Iraqis working hospitals; working baby incubators; working lights, refrigerators, and safe water in people's homes.

Also during 1991, Pentagon war strategist Colonel John Warden publicly explained why we bombed these targets: it created for us "long-term leverage"²⁸ on Iraq. When Iraq does as we tell them, he said, we'll allow them to repair their electrical generating plants.

The following year, the human consequences of our "long-term leverage" on Iraq began to be reported with scientific precision. The New England Journal of Medicine published a special survey on child mortality in Iraq²⁹. The report said that an "excess" of 46,900 Iraqi children died in the first eight months of 1991. These deaths were often due to epidemics of water-borne diseases due to the unsafe water supplies in Iraq.

Five years later, in an editorial calling for an end to sanctions, The New England Journal of Medicine summarized the relationship between the civilian infrastructure we destroyed and the ongoing deaths occurring in the country, especially among the children.

"The destruction of the country's power plants had brought its entire system of water purification and distribution to a halt, leading to epidemics of cholera, typhoid fever, and gastroenteritis, particularly among children. Mortality rates doubled or tripled among children admitted to hospitals in Baghdad and Basra. Cases of marasmus appeared for the first time in decades. The team observed `suffering of tragic proportions.... [with children] dying of preventable diseases and starvation.' Although the allied bombing had caused few civilian casualties, the destruction of the infrastructure resulted in devastating long-term effects on health."³⁰ (emphasis added)

Now, almost nine years after the Gulf war, it is still unsafe to drink the water in Iraq. In Basra the water is particularly dangerous. To conserve electricity, in Baghdad there are two daily power outages of three-hours each. In Basra, with 125-degree temperatures in the summer, the electrical outages are much greater. Until money is made available to repair the civilian infrastructure, the suffering and death in Iraq will necessarily continue.

On Presidential Palaces, Nutritional Biscuits, and Powdered Milk

A charge most often repeated is that the Iraqi government builds "palaces" while its citizens are suffering and dying. This section does not intend to justify those expenditures, but to add several observations that are believed relevant to our understanding.

The statement in the US report is "Saddam has spent over $2 billion on presidential palaces."³¹ If this number were correct, it would represent about 5% of the estimated amount of money needed to repair the civilian damage done to the infrastructure by the coalition forces during the Gulf war. This is not insignificant, but it does mean that 95% of the money needed to repair the life support systems can't be blamed on palaces.

However, the estimate of $2 billion (using the US reports' average monthly government salary of about $3.50) represents 47 million man-years worth of worth of labor! In 1996, the US State Department had claimed that Iraq spent $1 billion in building palaces. Members of the Center for Economic and Social Rights met with the US Mission to the UN to discuss this estimate. The Mission stated that their estimate was based on "the costs of constructing similar buildings in the region" - it therefor did not take account the real cost of labor in Iraq. Based on this, and other considerations in their report, CESR concluded that "it is very unlikely that Albright's estimate [of $1 billion] is accurate."³²

A second consideration is that Iraq has been building palaces for thousands of years. Recently, the head of an NGO who has worked many years in Iraq, said he believes these palaces are an expression of Iraq's pride (in standing up to the United States). He thinks this expression of pride may be more important to the Iraqis than the extra food, water, or electricity the money could buy. Whether or not this is true, by most accounts the Iraqi people principally blame the US government for their present suffering, not their leader.

The US report claims a "deliberate misuse of resources ... [as] cynical efforts to sacrifice the Iraqi people's welfare." In the following paragraph, as evidence, it says "Only $1.7 million of $25 million set aside for nutritional supplements has been spent by Iraq."³³ This is an item for which Unicef has also criticized Iraq (but without the claim of deliberate obstruction). To keep this in perspective, however, $25 million represents less than 1% of the $3.7 billion worth of food delivered under oil-for-food according to the US report.³⁴

Before sanctions, Iraq imported 70% of its food and medical needs, totaling about $4 billion a year. Over nine years, this represents $36 billion of largely unmet needs. Adding in the cost of repairing the civilian infrastructure brings the total needs to some $77 billion. (This is more than half of what President Clinton, during his December 15^th, 1998 televised explanation of "Desert Fox", claimed we have kept from Iraq by maintaining sanctions.) In comparison to these amounts, the US State Department's accusations of $10's millions in misused resources amount to less than 0.1% of the unmet needs of Iraq.

As a further claim of Iraqi manipulation of aid, the US report speaks of "the ship M/V MINIMARE containing 2,000 metric tons of rice and other material being exported from Iraq for hard currency instead of being used to support the Iraqi people."³⁵

In an April 1999 meeting with Hans von Sponeck, in describing his job as head of the oil-for-food program he gave this example "I want to say here too, apart from trying to be a decent manager of a complex program, I also want to be a troubleshooter. ... A contract is – we have just now had a case, we don't know yet how it will end – 2,600 tons of rice coming into the country, and we discover that the first layer of that rice is looking nicely and good as it should. You go a little bit further down and what you get is crusted, caked up with filth and dirt, infested stuff, obviously a supplier who has tried to pull a fast one. Iraq is very often the victim of this sort of taking advantage of a country that has no freedom of direct accessing and payment and controlling. They get, not everyday, but they do get these fraudulent contracts, and troubleshooting has to be done here too."³⁶

Might the ship the US report speaks of be carrying spoiled rice back to it's supplier? Would the US State Department honestly and carefully investigate this claim? Would the US State Department dismiss dishonest claims, even if they "served US interests"?

Directly following in the US report are charges that "Kuwaiti authorities recently seized a shipment coming out of Iraq carrying, among other items, baby powder, baby bottles, and other nursing materials for resale overseas."³⁷ Does the State Department not remember the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador, who testified before Congress in 1990, claiming that Iraqi soldiers had thrown babies out of incubators in Kuwait. This proved untrue.

Does the US report express an equal concern about Iraqi babies in incubators without electricity? Or does the US State Department choose which infants the "pursuit of our national interest" determines we should be concerned about? Does our "national interest" also determine how careful we are in investigating the reports we want to publicize.

Questions to be asked of the US State Department

While the US report asks many questions and makes many claims about Iraq, there are some questions which should be asked of the US State Department.

1. Since all of the money from the oil-for-food program is completely controlled by the UN, what reason does the US offer for ever limiting the amount of oil to be sold? It can only be used for food, medicine, and items approved by the sanctions committee.

2. Related to the first question, why can't the Iraqi food basket contain fruits, vegetables and sources of protein?³⁸ Why do we support a food program that none of us would want our kids to have to survive on for a week, let alone for years?

3. The US says "Sanctions are not intended to harm the people of Iraq. That is why the sanctions regime has always specifically exempted food and medicine."³⁹ This is true only of the UN. Why has the US always maintained sanctions on food and medicine?

4. Why has the US government threatened four US individuals, and the group they travel with, Voices in the Wilderness, with $163,000 in fines for bringing "medical supplies [medicines] and toys" to Iraq in violation of US sanctions law?⁴⁰

5. With Unicef reporting 960,000 Iraqi children chronically malnourished, why does the US continue to insist that 30% of the oil-for-food money should go directly for Gulf-war reparations? Shouldn't this wait until Iraqi children are adequately fed?

6. If the US says that sanctions are necessary to contain an Iraq dangerous to its neighbors,⁴¹ why did the Arab League's secretary general say this September that "Arab states would like to see the lifting of U.N. sanctions"⁴²?

Conclusion

Denis Halliday, after his 1998 resignation as UN Assistant Secretary General, said: "Sanctions are starving to death 6,000 Iraqi infants every month, ignoring the human rights of ordinary Iraqis, and turning a whole generation against the West. ... I no longer want to be part of that."⁴³ He also said "We are in the process of destroying an entire society… It is as simple and terrifying as that."⁴⁴

Madeleine Albright said that Saddam Hussein "does not care a fig about his people."⁴⁵ When asked on "60 Minutes" about half a million children's deaths in Iraq, she replied that they were "worth the price."⁴⁶ How much can we say Madeleine Albright cares about the Iraqi people? But --- if we allowed Ms. Albright to make such a statement without a huge national outcry --- how much can we say we care about the Iraqi people?

The United States continues to demonize one man --- a former ally --- as justification for a policy which continues to kill thousands of Iraqi children every month. Demonization is the deliberate and selective presentation of only the most negative aspects of a person. It cultivates hatred. Our cultivated hatred towards Saddam Hussein blinds us to the reality and consequences of our own actions.

If we pursue a foreign policy based on demonization, we are teaching our children those same habits --- of responding to difficult situations by cultivating hatred, assigning blame, and acting with violence --- domestically and personally, as well as internationally. What we do to people thousands of miles away, will and does come home to roost.

 

---

1 UN Unicef's Report "Results of the 1999 Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Surveys" is available at www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm and www.unicef.org/reseval/iraq.htm released August 12, 1999, hereafter called UN report.

2 US State Department Report "Saddam Hussein's Iraq" is available at www.usia.gov/regional/nea/iraq/iraq.pdf, last modified September 13, 1999, hereafter called US report

3 US Report, p. 5.

4 The New York Times, August 13, 1999, article "Children's Death Rates Rising in Iraqi Lands, Unicef Reports" by Barbara Crossette.

5 US Report, p. 6.

6 US Report, p. 6.

7 UN report, document entitled "A note on estimation of under-five deaths for Iraq over the period 1980 to 1998"

8 UN report, document entitled "A note on estimation of under-five deaths for Iraq over the period 1980 to 1998"

9 UN report "Child and Mortality Survey 1999, Preliminary Report", p. 11.

10 UN report, in "Estimates of under-five and infant mortality rates for Iraq over the period 1960 to 1998."

11 The Seattle Post-Intelligencer Special Report "Life and Death in Iraq" from May 11, 1999, can be read at xwww.seattle-pi.com/iraq and hardcopies of this report can be requested from the website.

12 Secretary of State Albright, February 18, 1997, Town Meeting, Ohio State University, as quoted from USIA at www.usia.gov/regional/nea/iraq/iraqwmd2.htm.

13 The Washington Post, August 12, 1999; Page A21, article "Mortality Up Among Children In Iraq Study: Rate Doubled Following Sanctions" by Colum Lynch

14 The New York Times, August 13, 1999, article "Children's Death Rates Rising in Iraqi Lands, Unicef Reports" by Barbara Crossette.

15 UN Unicef Newsline document "Iraq surveys show 'humanitarian emergency'" at www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm

16 UN Unicef Newsline document "Iraq surveys show 'humanitarian emergency'" at www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm

17 submitted letter to the editor of The New York Times, on August 13, 1999 by Richard Garfield, Professor, Columbia University

18 Meeting with Holdbrook Arthur and members of a visiting Voices in the Wilderness delegation in Baghdad, November 1996.

19 Private email correspondence from Nicholas Crawford at the World Food Program, August 21, 1999.

20 press release on "Changing the Spin on Iraq" by Denis J. Halliday, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq and currently a visiting professor at Swarthmore College, August 1999.

21 From transcript of meeting with Hans von Sponeck and members of a Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility delegation, on April 5, 1999, in Baghdad. It is available at www.scn.org/ccpi, and a report of the delegation back to WPSR and the parent medical organization IPPNW is at www.wpsr.org/mideast.

22 UN "Report to the Secretary General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management," March 21, 1991.

23 Toronto Star, editorial "Canada must speak out on embargo", September 12, 1999. Estimates for repair of the essential civilian infrastructure range from $21 billion (immediately after the war) to between $30 to $70 billion today. (This is also the range of damage estimated in NATO's recent bombing of Serbia.)

24 From transcript of meeting with Hans von Sponeck and members of a Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility delegation, on April 5, 1999, in Baghdad. It is available at www.scn.org/ccpi.

25 From transcript of meeting with Hans von Sponeck and members of a Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility delegation, on April 5, 1999, in Baghdad. It is available at www.scn.org/ccpi.

26 New York Times, September 20, 1999, "U.N. Official in Iraq Calls for Lifting of Sanctions", By Douglas Jehl

27 New York Times, March 22, 1991, "U.N. Survey Calls Iraq's War Damage Near-Apocalyptic", p. 1.

28 PBS' Frontline, "The War We Left Behind", 1991, interview with Colonel John Warden.

29 Ascherio A, Chase R, Cote T, et al. Effect of the Gulf War on infant and child mortality in Iraq. N Engl J Med 1992;327:931-6. [Erratum, N Engl J Med 1992;327:1768.]

30 Leon Eisenberg, The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters -- Human Costs of Economic Sanctions, N Engl J Med Volume 336(17).Apr 24, 1997.pp 1248-1250.

31 US report, p. 8.

32 Center for Economic and Social Rights publication "UNSanctioned Suffering: A Human Rights Assessment of United Nations Sanctions on Iraq", May 1966, p. 17. The CESR is based in NY City.

33 US report, p. 6.

34 US report, p. 5.

35 US report, p. 3.

36 From transcript of meeting with Hans von Sponeck and members of a Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility delegation, on April 5, 1999, in Baghdad. It is available at www.scn.org/ccpi.

37 US report, p. 3.

38 See the trip report, back to the Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, for a discussion of the inadequacy of the UN food basket, available at www.wpsr.org/mideast.

39 US report, p. 3.

40 For information on this proposed fine and US sanctions law, see the website of Voices in the Wilderness, www.nonviolence.org/vitw.

41 US report, p. 20.

42 South News, Sept 21, 1999

43 New York Times, October 18, 1998, p.4

44 Trip Report to the Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, available at www.wpsr.org/mideast.

45 Secretary of State Albright, February 18, 1997, Town Meeting, Ohio State University, as quoted from USIA at www.usia.gov/regional/nea/iraq/iraqwmd2.htm.

46 "Punishing Saddam," 60 Minutes, May 12, 1996.

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