UN's Denis Halliday - Full Interview Transcript
Thursday, 10 December 1998.
Former United Nations assistant secretary general Denis Halliday, who resigned earlier this year to highlight his opposition to the United Nations' Iraqi sanctions regime, talks to Wellington (New Zealand) Freelance Journalist Jeremy Rose. In the interview (a complete transcript follows) Halliday talks about United Nations polices in Iraq; his experiences of dealing with the Iraqi people; his impressions of UNSCOM; his views on UNSCOM executive chairman Richard Butler and former inspector Scott Ritter; and his views on the sanctions regime. Towards the end of the transcript Halliday talks about what New Zealand should be doing to assist in achieving a peaceful and just resolution of the current Iraqi crisis.
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Jeremy Rose: What was your position in the UN and what role did you play in Iraq?
Denis Halliday: I had the rank of assistant secretary general, which I had had for three years before I went to Iraq. I was the head of the office of human resources and management. The UN has about 15000 staff so I headed up that department. Then after three years of that, dealing with the fifth committee in the General Assembly, I asked Boutros Ghali would he be interested in having me go to Iraq which he agreed. And then when Kofi Annan took over he also agreed at the beginning of 1997, but released me only in the middle of 1997. Then I went out to Iraq retaining that title, assistant secretary general, but the local title was UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Iraq.
Jeremy Rose: What prompted you to ask to be sent to Iraq?
Denis Halliday: All my career in the UN has been mobile. I spent 10 years in South East Asia. Two years in the South Pacific. So of course I've been to NZ several times. I was in Samoa. I was the head of the UNDPE office there. So I've always a nomadic sort of career and I never intended to spend my life in New York. Secondly the frustration of living and working in New York, and thirdly the Iraq programme was unique and interesting. I was myself trying to find the right person to go there and found, in fact, the first and second interim co-ordinators.
Jeremy Rose: What did you find when you arrived in Iraq [in August 1997]?
Denis Halliday: I was taken aback by the decay and damage. I think we all overlook the effectiveness - it's not a very good word - of the coalition missile and bombing attacks. They very deliberately set about destroying the civilian infrastructure of the country. They went way beyond the military. They destroyed schools, and hospitals and bridges, and roads, places of employment, factories, consumer, industry and so on. That's left massive unemployment to this day. They destroyed railways, domestic airports, including not just the production of oil which they bombed and missiled again and again, but they also wiped out Iraq's capacity to produce potable water, the sewerage systems were heavily damaged, water treatment plants were damaged. It was a very all-comprehensive attack. And that is still rather apparent today.
Secondly was the fact that the programme we were running was totally inadequate and was not bringing in adequate funds for the UN and the Iraqi Government to meet the needs of the Iraqi people. And that was even with the oil-for-food deal, which is oft quoted by supporters of the sanctions as the response to [the impact of the sanctions]...Well it is a response. It was designed, I believe originally, to supplement what the Iraqis were doing for themselves. And that is indeed what it continues to do. The fact is, it is totally underfunded and inadequate and what it is doing today is sustaining malnutrition and it is sustaining the death of thousands of kids every month for lack of proper medical attention and clean water and so on.
Jeremy Rose: I think you quote the figure of between five and six thousand children dying every month as a result of the sanctions?
Denis Halliday: That's right. I saw recently the [Iraqi] government actually said eight, but then that includes adults. The figure I use say, six thousand, is according the World Health Organisation is an underestimate. Because what happens in Iraq is that rural children are not necessarily registered at birth, and if they die in the first week or so they are never registered. So I think six, or seven thousand is a perfectly accurate figure. UNICEF supports that also.
Jeremy Rose: How difficult was in working within Iraq. Was there much co-operation from the Iraqis with the humanitarian side of the UN?
Denis Halliday: Absolutely. This is terribly important to them. Without this programme there would be famine, there would be chaos in the country. So for both humanitarian and political reasons, they want the oil-for-food programme to work. And it does work, it does provide basic food, very basic foods - I should emphasise - to 23 and a half million people every month. And that's no mean achievement. That means, for example, in the last 18 months about eight million metric tonnes of food stuffs. Some medicine and some drugs have come into the country. That's a massive programme. There's nothing like that in the world.
The key to that is the fact that the purchasing process is handled by the government, not by the United Nations. My office in Baghdad was designed to oversee and monitor and observe this process. But in fact it was the Iraqi ministries of trade and health and so on who contracted and procured these supplies. Each contract being approved by the UN in New York the 661 committee of the Security Council.
Jeremy Rose: Our foreign minister [Don McKinnon] and, I believe, various US officials have claimed that the Iraqi regime simply don't care about their own citizens, what's your response to that in light of what, you've just told me?
Denis Halliday: That's absolute garbage, the fact is that before Saddam Hussein got himself into trouble in Iran, and then of course in Kuwait, they had invested massively in civilian infrastructure. Health care clinics, rural clinics, education, 10,000 schools scattered throughout the country, an educational and healthcare system which was the envy of all its Arab neighbours. Iraq had a very widespread food distribution system of its own before we got involved. This was designed for the widows and families of Iran war. Don't forget there was something like one million men killed during that war. So I mean there is no sign that that is correct.
Now we all focus on a number of atrocities and nasty things that went on. But the policy of the government was certainly to take care of its people and take care of its children. It's a country that is dedicated to its kids. Baghdad even today is full of green spaces, not as green as they used to be maybe, and children's playgrounds with Mickey Mouse. You know it's that sort of society. It's a very Islamic family place. And the Islamic family is alive and well.
Jeremy Rose: What prompted your resignation?
Denis Halliday: I found myself, as the most visible UN person in the country as head of the humanitarian programme. [Richard] Butler [executive chair of UNSCOM] just comes in and out for a couple of days, he's gone, he's not a presence there. Then to be identified with a United Nations that is both maintaining a sanctions programme, and which kills and maims people through chronic malnutrition on the one hand, and continues this programme knowingly. Because, that has got to be one's conclusion, is that the member states of the Security Council simply don't care.
And they know damn well what the price is and it's not justifiable. To have that going on and at the same time be trying to run a humanitarian programme that again was politicised by the member states and was being thwarted and blocked by the members of the 661 committee here in New York. Those two things are just incompatible with what I want to do.
And secondly, more importantly, incompatible with the spirit of the UN charter, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, The Convention on Human Rights. I mean, we the United Nations are running a programme that is in fact killing and maiming the children, and the next generation of Iraqis. I mean that is just a disaster. A disaster for the Iraqis and a disaster for the UN.
Jeremy Rose: What do you see as the way out of the present impasse. Do you support any form of sanctions?
Denis Halliday: No. I support a very active programme on disarmament and arms control for Iraq, and of course every other country in the world to be quite honest with you. What we've got to do is control arms manufacture and arms sales to countries throughout the world. That is clearly a long term need here. But in the immediate term I think there has got to be a continued programme with Iraq, and I think the Iraqis will understand that it is going to be absolutely necessary to monitor and control the manufacturing capabilities, the import of supplies, military and otherwise, required for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. I mean there is no way around that.
That does not require economic sanctions. That sort of arms control work has got to be done in some way that does not require that the children and the people of the country, who are after all innocent of any of the decisions vis-a-vis Iran or Kuwait or whatever, suffer. I think we've got to take the risk and give up economic sanctions while hanging on to the disarmament programme and allow the Iraqis to get on with rebuilding their country.
Jeremy Rose: How much of a risk is it?
Denis Halliday: I personally, perhaps I'm optimistic, given the conditions that exist today and the capacity that Iraq has. I don't think the risks are very great. I know none of us can trust this man. And none of us know what he's thinking or likely to do. But his capacity to do it, despite what UNSCOM says and others, is clearly absolutely marginal and will be, I would think, for a long time to come. And I think in the meantime what is required is to reverse the policy of isolation. Which is what is happening now. And as a result you're getting a new alienated Iraq. A new generation of Iraqis that don't anything about the Western world, and are alienated against Europe, North America and the west generally. And they're going to become the future of the next generation
I mean we're breeding a new type of Taleban in Iraq by forcing this alienation from what's going on in the world and this is a very dangerous approach. My approach would be to include Iraq again in the international community. Open up a sincere dialogue with the government on a whole range of fronts. Economic through cultural to whatever. And also to look at Iraq not as an isolated country, but look at Iraq as part of the Gulf region together with Iran, Kuwait and other Gulf nations who have a lot of common and mutual interests, and which are all having difficulty and all need to compromise and use the Gulf and its resources together.
I think there could be a much more positive approach. This is totally negative. I think there's no model world-wide where this approach has worked successfully. It's just crazy to continue this programme.
Then to have the Americans adding this, sort of bonus factors, things like assassination, or attempts to topple the president and so on, is outside the UN resolution in the first place - and secondly is to me unacceptable - and thirdly simply strengthens the president, Saddam Hussein. Because naturally his people - who may well have reservations about this man and what he's done to the country - are obliged then to rally around and support the leader who is under attack. It's a fairly common phenomena and this is exactly what the sanctions have done.
Jeremy Rose: Have they strengthened Saddam Hussein. Have they taken away any incentive for Saddam to negotiate?
Denis Halliday: Of course. As the Americans have kept on saying, "they are there until we kill you, or you die, or we get rid of you". How can you expect sincere co-operation from the man under those conditions? It's not serious. Maybe we're not getting it as a result. It's a totally screwed up policy. If it is a policy at all. That's one of the problems there is no policy of how to deal effectively with this part of the world which is so important. Including Iran, Kuwait and so on. Because to take Iraq in isolation just makes no sense. You've got to deal with Syria, and you've got to deal with the other countries which make up this area.
Jeremy Rose: New Zealand has in the last 48 hours decided to send some more military personnel to help in the blockade...(interrupted)
Denis Halliday: To work with UNSCOM?
Jeremy Rose: No, we've had people with UNSCOM. This time they're going to be on US vessels patrolling the Gulf.
Denis Halliday: That's very sad.
Jeremy Rose: What function will they be serving, and what message would you have for the NZ government?
Denis Halliday: I think it is a tragic compromise. New Zealand has been very strong on nuclear disarmament. Preventing its spread and usage. All the battles New Zealand has had with the Americans in the South Pacific and so on. To now turn around, and see New Zealand forces being associated with the Americans in the Gulf, where already they've used depleted uranium shells, against the Iraqis in the South - with the result of that you know, I mean the damage to both British and American servicemen plus the whole problem now in Iraq of the growth of cancer, leukaemia, amongst children - it's horrific what's happening and it comes out of this 300 tonnes of depleted uranium which the coalition forces used. So to see New Zealand mixed up with that, I think is really tragic.
Jeremy Rose: The New Zealand Government refers to it as backing the United Nations...(interrupted)
Denis Halliday: That's rubbish. As Kofi Annan said the other day - it may have been taken out of context, I'm sure he was simply explaining the reality - but the reality is that the Americans can attack Iraq tomorrow without any additional UN support or resolutions or whatever. It's very much a US/UK military endeavour.
Jeremy Rose: What are your thoughts on US and British threats of the use of air strikes against Iraq?
Denis Halliday: I am appalled that in 1998 mankind would consider resorting to the military brutalisation of the Iraqi people.
Jeremy Rose: What will it achieve apart from killing another 10,000 people according to the Pentagon own estimates?
Denis Halliday: It will boost support for Saddam Hussein both within Iraq and amongst his Arab neighbours and most third world countries fearful of being beaten up by the USA bully. It will possibly lead to total severance between Iraq and UNSCOM, plus and end to Oil for Food. They may decide, as many favour in Iraq, to simply to go it alone and be self reliant as they did in 1992-96. Were Saddam Hussein to be killed by strikes it would create a vacuum and possible chaos. The Turks might invade the north, the Iranians will watch the south etc. We might further de-stabilise the region. And no one seems to know what positively would be achieved!
Jeremy Rose: [Former UNSCOM weapons inspector] Scott Ritter resigned at a similar time to you, and I suspect has received far more publicity, particularly in the US....(interrupted)
Denis Halliday: Of course, he's an American hero?
Jeremy Rose: How important has his championing of a military solution been?
Denis Halliday: What he has done is demonstrated: firstly, that there is no policy, vis-a-vis Iraq on the part of Washington, there are various tools, like sanctions and threatened attacks, but they're not policies; and secondly that they don't know what they want. There is no long term thinking in the US State Department about what should be done about Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and so on. I think he's highlighted that very successfully. And that's probably useful because it means that there is going to have to be something done. And many things seem to be unfolding. I've been invited, for example to London, in two weeks time to participate in a seminar on sanctions, on alternatives, justifications and so on.
So I think there's more and more willingness throughout the world to think about some other way of dealing, not just with Iraq, but any country that behaves in a way that world can't accept. That's a positive. So I think Ritter - for all his, well in my mind, madness - has highlighted the need to come up with some solid thinking. And instead of this wishy-washy stuff of sustaining sanctions without quite knowing why - recognising that they don't actually work, but not having the guts to do anything about it - or to establish a deadline or whatever. In that sense maybe it's a positive thing. Maybe he's done everyone a favour by highlighting the effectiveness of the UN programme in Iraq, both humanitarian and UNSCOM.
Jeremy Rose: How much of an obstacle is Richard Butler to finding a solution?
Denis Halliday: I think it is unfortunate. I think Richard has become a problem himself, and that is recognised by the vast majority of the member states of the General Assembly and many of the member states of the Security Council. He seems to have an agenda of his own, or somebody else's. And his lack of independence is I think a problem for many, many member states. The fact that he is not a UN official is also something of a problem. He reports to the member states, not to the UN, or the Secretary General. And I think his style is in such contrast to [former UNSCOM chair, Rolf] Aekeus. Now the Iraqis didn't like Aekeus, but I think they recognised that he was a brilliant man and consistent and articulate and discreet. Whereas Richard of course is totally different from that, and enjoys the press conference, and all that sort of stuff which tends inevitably after his visits to stir up trouble and misunderstanding, and apprehension. I think its an unfortunate style and it has become much too personal. I don't think a change is viable. Washington now is obliged to support him to the hilt.
Jeremy Rose: What should countries such as New Zealand be doing in your view?
Denis Halliday: New Zealand is a country with a lot of integrity and reputation to protect, and use, and it seems to be that sanctions as a policy now impact on so many countries that they are something that probably should be raised in the UN General Assembly, and taken away from the Security Council. To have the Security Council overseeing a humanitarian programme -which was my experience, is in my experience, just a disaster. It just makes no sense.
So countries like New Zealand have a voice, they can use the media effectively, and they can take these to the General Assembly and force these sorts of programmes into the work of the General Assembly. Because clearly - I would say, 90% of the countries in the general assembly would raise the sanctions tomorrow. Would be willing to take the risk of working with Iraq in some more positive way. None of us, including myself, want to be seen as being soft on Saddam. But somehow you've got to separate this miserable man from the fact that his people are having one hell of a time.
These figures on malnutrition are serious. We're looking at a country where 30% of its kids are malnourished, 20% probably chronically. That's generational damage. These children are never going to be the same, they're going to have mental and physical stunting. This is criminal activity. I don't think the UN should be associated with that, nor anybody else.
Jeremy Rose: Our foreign minister has said it is up to Saddam to lift the sanctions?
Denis Halliday: That's wonderful, but that just means, because he's a son-of-a-bitch the rest of us can sink to that level. I don't think that works. I think that's a weak argument.
Jeremy Rose: Could you comment UNSCOM's use of Israeli intelligence?
Denis Halliday: How UNSCOM works to me is a mystery. But the link to the Mossad, is, I think, only one of many. I mean it is designed to use national intelligence organisations to do its job. So whether it is Israel or the CIA I don't think it makes much difference. The tragedy of Israel is two-fold. One is that the impression in the Arab/Islamic world, is that there are two different standards here. When Israel neglects resolutions, everybody closes their eyes. Beirut whereever. But when Iraq breaks a resolution all hell breaks loose and its missiles and bombs. That is clearly one perception that is I think pretty widely held.
The other great problem is that Israel is such an important part of that region… And somehow, someway, I am always optimistic that the Arabs will adjust, as has and is happening all of the time. Will adjust to a more friendly Israel that is willing to collaborate and create a whole. Because Israel could make such a significant contribution to that part of the world. And I go back to the 60s when I worked in Iran, and Israel provided technical assistance to the Iranians on many fronts. And the potential is there.
You can visualise in the perfect world Israel collaborating with its Arab neighbours providing expertise, even funding possibly or visa-versa, for all sorts of common needs, like fresh water for example. It would be glorious. But I know that sounds naïve. But frankly for the future it is the only way to go, and I believe that whenever it is, 30 - 40 years, that is exactly what will happen. It is only a matter of time. I'm sure we will see a sort of EU of the Gulf region in due course, including Israel. It has just got to happen.
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© Author. Thursday, 10 December 1998.