-- Who is Speaking for Iraq's Children? --
U.S. Sanctions & Mideast Anger

A public talk by Hans von Sponeck
Former U.N. Assistant Secretary-General
& U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq

Seattle, Washington
9 November 2001

 

Rev. John Boonstra remarks

...here tonight, and it is valuable. He has argued that these smart sanctions will not lead to improvements, but will, in his words, be a tightening of the rope around the neck of the average Iraqi citizens. Mr. von Sponeck believes that only a restoration of a national economy can end the ten-year decline that has inflicted enormous human costs and made Iraq's infant mortality rate near the highest in the world. The connection of U.S. government response to September 11th, and the calculated catastrophe in Iraq, are haunting. Tonight, as we seek to sharpen our vision of what needs to be done to achieve justice in Iraq without the bloodshed that occurred during and following the Gulf War, and now in Afghanistan, we can celebrate that Mr. von Sponeck is a living reminder that individuals can make a powerful difference.

Hans, in living out your vision for the dignity and well-being of every person, not just Americans, you have become a powerful example to us, about the importance of conscience in times saturated with the unconscionable. We welcome you back to Seattle, we are thankful for your voice, for your quest for the truth, and for your presence here tonight with us. Welcome.

Hans von Sponeck

I hope you can hear me, but let me just start by saying I'm always very touched when I hear such warm words of welcome as I've heard them from Reverend Moe, from you, Reverend Boonstra, from my friend Bert Sacks, and from all the others who make it easy for me to be as transparent as I can possibly be. It also pains me a little bit that I'm always speaking about an ugly subject in a very beautiful environment, like a church like this one. But I guess that should not make me be less transparent and less critical of something which I have so painfully observed very directly during the 17 months I lived in Baghdad, and injustice with the government of Iraq, with the U.S. State Department, with the British Foreign Office, and with the U.N. Security Council.

This morning I was asked to speak with a person in KIRO [radio station], which is the Dave Ross Show, I guess it's called, I don't like the word. [laughter] But after that, someone called and said that he was sick and tired to hear a German appeaser, that what one should really do is bomb Iraq. Well, everyone is entitled to his or her view -- I'm not an appeaser. I'm simply a person who has been in a certain reality. If you had been in that reality, I think you would have acted just as I did. So I'm not an appeaser.

I'm also not a fanatic, and I want to assure you, if I'm critical of U.S. foreign policy, that doesn't make me anti-American, at all. I'm pro-American in many ways. My wife, for one, is American. My son here in the audience is half-American and half-German. So I have studied in this country, I've been a UN official here in New York for three years, so I'm not anti-American at all. I'm also not an apologist for a brutal dictator. But when I speak about Saddam Hussein, I also want to be fair here somewhere. He is not a self-made man either. We have a whole portion to deal with his ascendancy to brutality, and we should not totally forget that.

Nor am I -- and I want to say this particularly if, in this audience tonight are also people from Northern Iraq maybe, from Kurdistan, Kurds -- by not talking about the Kurdish issue doesn't make me insensitive to their very special circumstances. But this is only a fleeting moment that we have together, and I must concentrate on Iraq and sanctions.

Lastly, several times in Europe, there was a reference to the question of whether this man standing in front of an audience could possibly be paid by the Iraqis. I guarantee you, I'm not paid by the Iraqis.

It may be a little bit surprising, but bear with me, that so much that is being said about terrorism, and I just feel compelled to begin with a minute of general observation that relates to what I call the "widening scissors." The widening scissors, I refer here to the widening gap between wealth and poverty. And I think that kind of a discussion is relevant to a discussion of terrorism and maybe even a discussion of terrorism and Iraq. But let me just say, in the 30 years out of the 32 years that I was in the United Nations, I was dealing with poverty issues, with development issues. And therefore I'm very sensitive to that particular source of so much international conflict. And when you look at United Nations and other documentation and you see what really is a widening scissors, a widening gap between, for example, the top 20 percent and the bottom 20 percent in our world, I think when we try, cool-headed as we must be, to analyze the causes of terrorism, we have to talk about and think about that effect also. Because I firmly believe that sick minds -- and sick minds are the ones that are involved in terrorism -- have a very fertile ground on which they can thrive, in poverty. And if we overlook that, I think then we are not finding a path towards a solution, in trying to get out of this most extreme form of dissatisfaction, which is terror.

If you look for example, I just want to give you a few, to me, significant pieces of evidence of this widening scissors before I move into the subject of tonight. But if you look, for example, at income, at national per-capita income. You compare the top, which is the US, with $29,000 US dollars per person per year, with the bottom, Sierra Leone, of $450. This is the enormous scissors, and it's widening, it's getting worse.

If you look at longevity. If today you happen to be born in Japan, your chances that you will see your 80th birthday are absolutely the average. That is the average longevity, 80 years. But if you happen to be born in Malawi in Central Africa, your chances to see your 30th birthday are statistically not good. The average lifespan in Malawi is 29 years.

If you look at the global gross national product in the economic statistics, I think you would see something you may not expect. 81 -- 81 percent of global income is linked to 26 countries. And the other 160 countries that are members of the United States have the balance, 19 percent. So this is a fantastic disparity here between the haves and the have-nots.

And what I always feel is a figure that I can almost not believe, but you can read it and you can follow it in the annual UN Human Development Report, great document to have, I encourage you to obtain it, because they compare 170-plus -- not all the countries, not all the 189 member countries of the UN -- but most of them are compared in terms of economic indicators in terms of social indicators, from crime rate in different countries to longevity and water supply, education, they're great. But if you look at the 1998 report, you see a figure which you probably think I'm inventing, but I'm not, it's simply passed on from the document. There are -- or there were 357 billionaires in this world that own 45 percent of global wealth. 357 individuals having 45 percent of global wealth, that's the wealth of the earth, cash liquid wealth, in their pockets. Now, can there be a greater disparity than that if one compares this to the fact that there are 1.5 billion out of the 6 billion people that we are now in our globe, who have less than $1 day. 1.5 billion people having less than a dollar in their pocket per day, 357 individuals who have 45 percent of global wealth.

Now, with the kind of enormous disparity one should not -- one should not -- really be surprised that there is a sweltering ocean of dissatisfaction that at times then can translate into various forms of animosity, of hostility, towards those who are more fortunate but have so much excessive of wealth to live on.

And my last figure here which is again to me always a powerful reminder that we have to -- that we have to become simply a little bit more humble in our lives, and that is when I read and re-read that nine of our industrialized countries spend, in six days, $690 million dollars in dog and catfood, while 31 percent of children under 5 globally are malnourished.

These are just a few examples that I think dramatically, for me, at least, document the danger of the sort of things that we are seeing, and have seen most recently on the 11th of September. That is maybe an extreme manifestation, but there are many shades below that. And I hope that as our leaders begin to reflect on how and what they can do to get out of this sort of reality, that our response is more human security, less military security. Human security is what life should be about, and I hope our leaders understand that, better than they seem to at the moment.

I want to start now my most specific observations on Iraq and sanctions by telling you that when it comes to this horrific, horiffic savagery of the 11th of September, that any decent person, anywhere, not just here in America, will feel angry, sad, and full of rejection for this atrocity. And in a way, we all, whether we are foreign or whether we are American, will feel American. The Europeans will feel with you as Americans, the Asians will feel with you as Americans, the Africans will feel with you as Americans. But I think we must not measure the tragedy of the 11th of September with a yardstick that is different -- it's different from the yardstick with which we measure other tragedies around the world. And I would include here the tragedy of a criminally faulty foreign policy practiced by members of the UN Security Council, including your government. I'm sorry, and I remind you here, anti-foreign policy doesn't make me anti-American. But I have to say that, because it is a well-documented evidence of a wrong policy.

So when it comes to Iraq -- and some of the statistics that I will give you in the course of this evening -- then I must tell you, I feel angry, I feel sad, I feel I must reject wholeheartedly, and in the context of Iraq, I feel Arab and I feel Iraqi. There's no other way.

I want to more specifically now try and explain to you what comprehensive economic sanctions have done to Iraq in the 11 years that such sanctions have existed. Practically, today Iraq is stripped of the sovereignty that normally an independent country enjoys. Iraq's oil revenue, the lifeline for the people of Iraq, the oil revenue has been put into a French bank account, the Bank Nacional de Paris, and it is managed not by Iraq but by the United Nations. That's number one.

Number two, you need, everyone needs, a recurrent budget to finance civilian infrastructure costs. Your teachers must be paid. Your civil servants must be paid. The roads must be kept in good order. The hospitals must be kept. And if there is no money allocated for that -- and I'll come back to this later -- then you won't get very far.

I heard with great interest that King County here, your county, one of your counties, has a recurrent budget of $2.8 billion for 1.7 million people that live in King County, I'm told. Well, Iraq also needs some money, and Iraq under sanctions doesn't get one single dollar to maintain its civilian infrastructure. And indications, of course, of that are clear, I will come back and explain this a little bit more. But the point furthermore is, as far as comprehensive economic sanctions are concerned, no foreign investment. The oil industry cannot be modernized, there's no permission to open new oil wells. So Iraq can de facto only carry out simple repairs to the oil industry, no more than that. That's a Band-Aid approach, a very costly Band-Aid approach. But there is nothing that is permitted beyond that.

And as a result of having really stymied an economy, you can imagine what that means to employment, what that means to heads of households earning a living. Not possible. All they have is to hold out their hand and get every month something which I will explain when I briefly talk about the oil-for-food program.

There is a massive social transformation occurring in Iraq today which in fact means that the normal structure of the society, in particular the very strong and well-developed middle class, is dying out. Either they have emigrated, many are here, maybe even in this group here tonight, or they have become de-professionalized, not able to work in the fields for which they were trained. And I want to remind you that Iraq had probably the most progressive economic and social system in the Middle East. Had a lot of money, it could do things, and they did things. In fact, they did them so well that in 1987, Iraq was awarded an international prize by UNESCO for having successfully brought down illiteracy to a level of 20 percent. 80 percent of the Iraqis in 1987 knew how to read and write, and the progress was so strong that a UN body could honor Iraq, that it had made such progress.

In 1997, ten years later, the illiteracy rate has climbed back up to 45 percent. And with the main victims, women. Iraq was proud that it had a gender balance, that boys and girls in equal measure could go to school and could learn and could progress in life. That today is quite a different story.

So with this development, with this trend, it couldn't be hidden for 11 years. The knowledge. Also thanks to groups that came to Baghdad, came to Iraq, saw the situation, reported back, and I want to single out and make special mention of the fact that when I served and lived in Baghdad for a year and a half, there was no other nationality that came more often to Iraq than American citizens. They came to see, Bert Sacks here in the front row is just one example of a person who had the courage to come, to understand. So the Americans were very sensitive to this situation, they wanted to interpret. And as a result of that, changes did occur and the truth about the conditions in Iraq gradually surfaced more and more.

So I want to quickly allay the impression that this is something overwhelming, huge political problems that an individual citizen of a country cannot make a difference. Yes, we can all make a difference, and I think you should not feel shy, even with this overwhelming attempt to muzzle, and muzzling there is plenty, I have experienced it firsthand. In fact, the spokesman of the State Department, when I began to speak out, because I felt I was not just the manager, I also was an interpreter. James Rubin said, "This man in Baghdad is employed to work, not to talk." Well, I think we should all not accept something like that. We must talk when we recognize something as faulty and as punitive as the comprehensive economic sanctions.

The point I want to make is, that under increasing pressure from some governments -- for example, the Malaysian government, strong opponent to this kind of approach. But also from public groups, like groups in this country, gradually the U.S. and British foreign offices were cornered and had to come up with something new. What could that something new be. So here there was reference made already in the introduction, the term "smart sanctions" came forward. It's not a new term, but it came for the first time last June as far as Iraq is concerned. And as you can imagine, fertile minds quickly reacted saying well, if they now after 11 years introduce smart sanctions, what were the sanctions during the previous 10 years or so. And you can give it any name, and the fact was that they were very punitive and very wrong, and punished the wrong party.

So smart sanctions became the new slogan, and it looked good. And initially I thought, "Hah! Here is maybe a chance for finally for some more humane approach." How wrong was I. And I want to tell you why. Because the initial impression and what one still reads is that "smart" sanctions as proposed by the UK and supported by the US meant a freeing of all the restrictions on the import of civilian goods into Iraq. That sounded good and a good development. Not at all what I wanted to see, and that is a kickstart of the Iraqi economy, a return for the Iraqis to fend for themselves, and to understand again what self-realization means. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has that provision: a right for people to realize their full potential, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Not possible under the present circumstance.

So that would not have been possible even under the smart sanction proposals unless you are really giving a chance for the Iraqi economy to function again. Under smart sanctions, that is not possible. Under smart sanctions, foreign investment is not possible. Under smart sanctions, the rehabilitation and modernization of the oil industry is not possible. So the basic parameters of the earlier comprehensive economic sanctions resumes, didn't change.

Until this moment what I've said so far, I don't think the term "malicious" would be apt to describe the smart sanctions proposal. The malicious part comes in when you read on -- very rarely actually reported -- and that is that Iraq's border with Turkey in the north, with Syria, with Jordan, with Iran, and of course with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, would be hermetically closed. No more expert of illegal oil outside. Well, if you hear this, you will say, "Great, this is fine, that's how it should be. Why should Saddam Hussein have the right to smuggle oil out?"

Well, you heard me earlier explain to you that he didn't, that government doesn't get a penny for recurrent costs, for servicing of the civilian infrastructure. And when you have that, this was a punitive, deliberate act because it was the, what should I say, the repercussions of that were clear. If you have that situation, the government has to go that road towards adding revenue. And that revenue that they are getting, the highest figure that I have seen in the press comes to $3 billion US per year. If you take the population of 23 million and you divide $3 billion, you get $130 per person per year. That's all there is for extra, for recurrent costs for them.

And then you will say, yes, I did read about the policies the luxury goods and all the wasteful expenditure, it is correct, there is that. But that government, that brutal dictator and his government in Iraq have no choice, also for political reasons, to use, I would say not less than 90 percent of that $130 per person per year for the civilian infrastructure. The teachers, even though they are unbelievably badly paid -- a teacher, a primary school teacher gets 10,000 dinar or $5 a month. A professor in a university gets the equivalent of 19,000 dinar a month, that's just under $10. Now, the $130 per person must be used, otherwise it has severe implications, the nation will collapse completely. It's already near a collapse. But if you don't use this, then it may be even worse.

So if you deprive Iraq from that income, then you are strangulating the Iraqis further, and the malicious part comes in when the UK explains if the Iraqis continue to suffer after we have introduced smart sanctions, it's entirely the fault of the government. Now, the government can be blamed for many things, but increasingly, the external side can be blamed for more. And when it comes then to be so dishonest as pretending that you're trying to do something for the people while in fact you are making it worse for the people, then I think we have a very serious situation, and we have to of course prevent such smart sanctions from being adopted.

And for once, for once, the Russians boycotted, they vetoed. There is not often a veto in the UN Security Council when it comes to Iraq, but on this one, the Russians stalled, and it failed, and I hope the smart sanctions proposal will never ever see the daylight again. But we will soon see what happens.

I had ten days, two weeks ago with the Russian Ambassador a meeting in New York. He said to me, "Most likely we will go the easy way and that is a technical resolution where we simply extend the oil for food program for another six months." That means, ladies and gentlemen, business as usual. And if you accept the figure of 147 children per day dying, according to UNICEF, children under five, multiply this by six months. And I kept saying as early as October 1999 when I was the Assistant Secretary General for Iraq, in Baghdad, don't, government of Iraq, US, UK, the Security Council, do not, do not! play the political battle on the backs of the Iraqi people.

So it's just easy to do this. You continue to play that political battle. And then if you come to May, June, early July, then you look forward to your vacation. The Security Council then is empty in New York, more or less. People go away and forget that while you are somewhere enjoying your holiday, in Iraq, the dying continues. All that, of course, plays into my determination that I could not be associated any longer with faulty policy, and by being associated with it, being also part of an act that is a violation, a clear violation of international law.

Now a word on this oil for food program. Because the oil for food program in a way is a smokescreen, a moral smokescreen, a fig leaf. It pretends to do something for the Iraqi people, and I would say -- and I've said to the press -- yes, it's an important program, the oil for food program. Without it the people would be even worse off than they already are. But it is at the same time a completely, completely inadequate program.

Again, figures -- figures to me, I hope to you also, will make the point I'm trying to make. In 4½ years of this oil for food program, I want to give you four figures. The first one is the entire oil revenue from these 4½ years comes to $44.4 billion. For the humanitarian side, for the oil for food program, $26.3 billion became available. The balance was almost entirely available to what is called the United Nations Compensation Commission. That is a Commission in Geneva which gets its funding, 30 cents out of the earned oil dollar, and uses it to defray claims made by governments, by companies and by individuals who feel that as a result of the invasion of Iraq into Kuwait, they were victimized. So that money is already taken out from getting to or meeting the needs of the Iraqi people. That means, that's the difference between $44.4 billion and $26.3 billion.

Now, that amount of $26.3 billion, if it had been entirely spent on humanitarian supplies, would have meant -- quite a sobering figure, I think -- $220 US per person per year in humanitarian supplies. That's all. But what actually, what actually had arrived during that period from December '96 to July 2001 is half of it: $13.5 billion. And that translates into a per capita figure of -- and I call this, and you understand why, the $119.70 scandal. Because it is clearly a scandal! $119.70 is the entire amount that Iraqi civilians got as benefits under the oil for food program per year per person. And that is for what? That is not an amount in the pocket. This is for food, for medicines, for water, for sanitation, for agriculture, for electricity, and for education. That is nothing.

So how -- each time I say what I say to you now, I get really upset. On the 5th of December, last year, the US ambassador to the Security Council, goes before the Council and says the US government is satisfied that the oil for food program meets the needs of the Iraqi people. You can read it. It's a public document. $119.70 is enough to meet the needs of the Iraqi people? I can't comprehend it.

And what is also forgotten, and I'm sure in a church is appreciated, is that life -- and we kept saying this, again and again, my UN colleagues and I -- live is not just about meeting physical needs. What about nonmaterial needs, what about spiritual needs, that was -- spiritual needs, you better not mention it, because you would have been considered as even more blue-eyed and naïve as I already was considered when I started to speak out and protest. Non material needs about, see I mentioned self-realization, dignity -- no chance. You work for your living, to have the feeling that you get a maximum opportunity to develop your human person as is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- no chance! Absolutely impossible. But it was, even if you just looked at it narrowly, about physical needs, what is $119.70?

So very upsetting, the inadequacy of this program, and also associated with this, dishonesty, straightforward dishonesty. The press reported, Iraq, the oil ceiling has been lifted. Iraq can pump as much oil as it wants, and if it doesn't do that, you see, it is simply because they don't care about their own people. What was not said is -- and you can check it if you don't believe, you can go to the internet, you can see the oil production figures for Iraq before and after that oil ceiling was lifted -- and you will see no change. Because it cannot change. The oil industry, according to the oil missions that we have every year, international missions led by even the British, very interesting, the British came to Iraq, led the oil mission, and the conclusion, year after year, was the same. The Iraqi oil industry is in a dangerous state, and many of us, including myself, felt surprised that there hasn't been a major environmental catastrophe involving the Iraqi oil industry. And if you look at the oil flows -- haven't changed. Exports, between 2 and 2.2 million barrels a day. That is all.

So oil ceiling removal was meaningless. They could say that because they knew that the Iraqi oil industry could not possibly produce more.

So we are stuck with a very poorly implemented -- because neither the government of Iraq, initially, nor today the British and American governments, want to see that oil for food program running well. At this very moment, if you were to go and check, you would see that the figure of $4 billion US in stalled items, in held-back items, by the Security Council, 98 percent of the account blocked, is a reality. Can you imagine that? $4 billion worth of magazines, of electricity spare parts, of oil spare parts, not reaching there, having been ordered, having been paid for very often, cannot come because of the fear or the alleged fear that this is because of "dual use" -- because it could be used by the military.

And sometimes it gets so ridiculous that one can laugh even when the circumstances are so serious. You probably have heard the most extreme case, is the pencil story. Pencils were stopped from coming to Iraq because they contained graphite. And graphite you can use to make bombs. How many pencils do you need to make a bomb?

So it becomes ridiculous, because it's not ridiculous. It is punitive. Everything -- I could spend an hour to show you how punitive every aspect of this treatment of Iraq is, including holding back 30 cents out of each oil dollar earned. That money was needed badly, particularly in the initial phases of the oil for food program, when there was a cap. Indeed, there was a cap. The cap was $2.2 billion. Out of that they take 30 percent. What the net was, was $1.3 billion for six months. That's nothing. That is a pitiful figure that is not even remotely able to meet the minimum physical needs of the country. So punitive.

Then comes, unfortunately -- and maybe there are lawyers here in the audience -- the international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Conventions on the Right of the Child, the Hague Convention, are not tangible enough to protect innocent civilians under conditions as they exist in Iraq. And when you have, for example, Article 39 of the UN Charter, which is the basis for imposing sanctions, you read there "a country can be awarded sanctions, can be punished with sanctions, when there is an act of aggression or a threat to international security." That wording alone is intangible. What constitutes an act of aggression? What is a threat to international security? Different interpretations.

But the power in the UN Security Council is the US. And it is, some people facetiously say it is no longer the UN Security Council, it's the US Security Council. So this determines how one interpreted that international law. And it was the Canadian foreign minister, the former one, Lloyd Axworthy who said, who reminded the UN Security Council, the international sanctions should be implemented in accordance with international objectives and not in accordance with national interests of individual member countries. He was kind, he said "countries." He should have said country. Because it was the US that was the determining voice. It's a fact, this is not a biased value judgment, it is a fact. And we know very well how many cowards there are in the UN security council.

In December of '98, when the new Iraq resolution was decided, China, Russia and France all three didn't do what their integrity should have demanded them to do. Why not? China wanted to get into the World Trade Organization. Russia had Chechneya around its neck. And France was a member of NATO. So all of them, for extraneous reasons as far as Iraq is concerned, decided to not do what their sense, what their convictions, their knowledge demanded, and that is to veto the proposal for a new UN resolution on Iraq which, in the Middle East, people started saying, do you know the saying which is "A mountain became pregnant and a little mouse was born." That little mouse was Resolution 1284, of December '98, which was not only a little mouse, but it was a dead mouse because it was never implemented.

So here we have international law that is not tangible enough to protect a situation like an Iraq from misuse. And on top of it, and maybe that suffices to show you how punitive this whole approach is.

In the last 11 years, the procedure of the UN Security Council has changed. There is an ambassador who was the president of the Security Council who did an analysis, and he came out with the following findings. In the beginning, the meetings in the Security Council were considered public meetings, which means that every member government who wishes to sit in and listen and react could come and do so. The rules changed, and today, since quite a few years, the meetings are informal -- the meetings are considered informal meetings of the Security Council when it comes to Iraq. And that means only the 15 members of the Security Council can attend these meetings. Which also explains why when I came to New York to brief the UN Security Council, in the beginning I couldn't quite understand why each time Iraqi diplomats would mill with other diplomats outside the chambers of the Security Council. They would be anxious to pick up a word, to say hello to a few friends that they had. But when the actual meeting happened and the doors of the UN Security Council closed, Iraqis, Iraqi diplomats were not allowed to join. They were kept out. So they could not even participate, to discuss or respond to issues involving their own country. I think that's maybe a dramatic example of the punitive nature with which Iraq has been treated.

And then you get the media. Now, these days, this is why a little bit I started talking about terrorism, because there is that link between terrorism, anthrax, and Iraq. Read for facts. You won't find the facts. It's conjecture. And do we really, do we really have the courage to batter a people who have been punished for 11 years? Because the government of Saddam Hussein is in good shape, they are stronger and more stable than many other Middle Eastern governments. But the people are in bad shape. Now, can we continue to build a policy, and maybe even now prepare for an attack against Iraq based on conjecture? I don't think we can, I think we must not. And it looks as if we want to really go ahead in finishing what some of us -- some of our leaders consider "unfinished business." I think that's very dangerous, and as the Secretary General of the Arab League said, "You are setting the Middle East in flames if you start attacking Iraq." I felt this was a courageous statement that was made there.

At the very end, let me just say, I would be -- I would be wrong if I wouldn't offer at least a moment of thought on how -- what can we do. And what we can do and should do is to reconvert the United Nations into that house of dialogue, not maintain the United Nations as a house of confrontation. The UN was created to solve conflict. And now the UN exists and creates conflict. That is an anomaly with such grave consequences that I am, even in these difficult days when you in America and we in Europe and elsewhere try to find a way out of these very intractable problems that confront us, I think the word "dialogue" must become an acceptable word, and the Iraqis must be given an opportunity to meet with the Security Council.

And if they talk rubbish, if they are dishonest, if we don't have a hidden agenda we have enough knowledge to know whether they are honest or not honest with us. And give them a chance to explain themselves. On the 26th of this year [sic] the Secretary General has his first meeting with the foreign minister of Iraq, and it was a promising step forward. But he was muzzled. He was told by the British and American governments, "You stop meeting with the Iraqis until we have developed another Iraq policy." Well, where is the other Iraq policy? This was in June, we are now in November.

So dialogue, meeting at that level, is to me very important. As is important that the Arabs are meeting among themselves. King Abdulla of Jordan and the Secretary General of the Arab League, Dr. Ama Mousa [phonetic], have been appointed to be negotiators, read conciliators if you want, between Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Give them a chance, and let us as Westerners not always have this horrible tendency of looking over other people's shoulders and trying to make sure that what they're writing down and what they're discussing is what we want them to do. If we do that, we are inviting more of what we are seeing these days. And shouldn't be at all surprised. So let the Arabs talk among themselves.

Three or four years ago one could have said, yes, it's possible to look at Palestine and look at Iraq separately. No more possible. Today these two things are inextricably linked, and the Middle East peace process must involve both. But as a forerunner to hopefully an eventual dialogue with Israel. Israel cannot be ignored, must not be ignored, but at this point it becomes there must be an opportunity for the Arab governments to meet among themselves.

And lastly, there has to be also an intra-Iraq dialogue, between the Kurds in the north and those that live south of the line of control and the Baghdad authorities. The Shiites and other minorities must talk, and the Shiites -- sorry, they are not a minority [short amount of missing text]. But we don't continue to do, to say one thing but in fact do what Henry Kissinger said with such brutal frankness a few years ago when he said, "Oil is much too important a commodity to be left in the hands of the Arabs." With that attitude, God help us, that's all I can say.

But let me at the very end, just a little story which I told to Bert this afternoon -- in fact, this afternoon which I think makes a good point. And the point is obvious. But it's something which I always remember when there's a moment when you think, "What can we as individuals really do to make a difference."

And then I remember that little story, of the old man who walked along the beach. I was the UN representative in India, and it reminds me of an Indian beach where you see a lot of starfish lying in the sun. And the sun is brutal, the suns kills the starfish unless the starfish has a chance to find water. So he walks along the beach, and he sees this little girl, and she picks up a starfish and throws it into the waves.

And he goes to her and says, "What are you doing?" And she says, "I'm just throwing this back in the water. The brutal sun will kill the starfish."

And he says, "But there are thousands of starfish here on the beach, this is not going to be very helpful."

She takes another starfish, and she looks at the old man, and she throws it into the water, and she says, "It made a difference to this one.'

Thank you very much.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I was going to say, there's been a lot of dismissal of some of the things that have been connected, like policies that have been associated or been advanced as possible triggers of the 9/11 terrorism attack, the September attacks, including the Iraq sanctions and military presence in Saudi Arabia and the situation in Israel/Palestine. And the government and media here tend to dismiss all that as propaganda, but I have the strong sense that there are millions of people in the Middle East and elsewhere who, you know, would not lift a violent hand against anybody, but at the same time they share the same anger about these issues that might have motivated the terrorist organizations. And I was just wondering if you wanted to address that. Do you have a sense of how the ordinary people over there feel about these issues, whether or not they would consider doing anything paramilitary or whatever, political.

HANS VON SPONECK: Thank you very much. I have two comments. The first one is I was amazed in Iraq how fine a distinction the Iraqis made between the policy and people. The American, the visitors, international visitors, were treated with great respect, with great friendliness and hospitality. A day after the four-day bombing, December of '98, when I went downtown Baghdad, I saw a young American -- a young Iraqi boy with a sweatshirt and the American flag was on the sweatshirt. No problem.

Internationally, in the Middle East, there is a growing anger. And going to far -- on the 9th of October I was in Beirut attending a meeting of church leaders from the Middle East Council of Churches. And the Archbishop of North Lebanon said in a public meeting -- not what I would say, but he said, he called on the American people to rise against their government. Now, if in church circles and intellectual houses there is such a reaction, you can imagine how the reaction is on the street. People feel in the Middle East like they are treated like second-class citizens, globally speaking. And we have to be very careful that we make people realize through our acts that this is not what we as citizens of the western world really imply. So it's a great challenge.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: One of our great concerns is weapons of mass destruction, and the sanctions were imposed supposedly because of these weapons of mass destruction, biological and nuclear programs in Iraq. Can you tell us both what you know about those programs at this point, and what can we do -- given that the United States has yet to give up their weapons of mass destruction -- in places like Iraq?

HANS VON SPONECK: You have done already a lot. I mean, Iraq has been certified, or was certified, on the nuclear and ballistic side, as being no longer a danger. On the chemical side, it was ready for signature and then, of course, the bombardment of Iraq in December of '98. The gap was on the biological side. There were question marks. Not much was left according to what Richard Butler said.

But let me read to you what Scott Ritter, one of the chief arms inspectors in the disarmament group that was in the same office where I served in Baghdad, what he had to say to the Los Angeles Times on the 12th of October of this year [http://www.commondreams.org/views01/1012-04.htm], and I quote:

"With its military poorly trained and equipped, its economy in tatters, and once-vaunted weapons of mass destruction largely dismantled by UN weapons inspectors, Iraq today represents a threat to no one."

And I would like to add a quote of the outgoing Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, who said to the incoming president of the US on the 10th of January, "Iraq no longer poses a military threat to its neighbors."

What we read is quite different. What we read is this man is again cooking evil things and is preparing weapons of mass destruction -- we have no evidence. I would just -- I would just caution against shaping, on the basis of what you read, an opinion that Iraq still constitutes a threat. I don't think so.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was wondering if you could perhaps address the issue of bodies like the international criminal court? I've been thinking about this for the resolution of the current conflict, but your speech made me wonder if maybe something like that shouldn't be used with regards to people like Saddam Hussein as an alternative to these kind of "stupid" sanctions, not smart.

HANS VON SPONECK: Well, you are referring to targeted sanctions, you are referring to targeted punishment. And the International Court of Criminal Justice I think was a very good phenomenon to arise, and it is just very sad that it is another example of the US government-supported isolationists -- because you don't want to join. You also don't want to join the Biological Warfare Treaty, you want to drop out of the Kyoto Protocol. You don't want to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. You want to repeal the ABM treaty. Now, with this kind of isolationist approach, we need you. You are too important. If you drop out, many things will not happen. So I just would say it's a good idea, it should be promoted, and now I say something which is probably the most aggressive thing that I will have said tonight, is if it becomes a reality and Saddam Hussein is being tried, I hope there are a few chairs empty to make some other people sent next to him who would also need to be tried. Thank you. [Applause.]

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sir, I have two unrelated questions. First, I heard your predecessor Denis Halliday speak here a couple of years ago. He, like you, resigned from his position. I'm wondering what you thought of what he had to say at the time he resigned and before you took the position there, compared to what you found. Second question, have you been invited to D.C., Washington, D.C. to speak before any committee or subcommittee on this subject, and if so, what was the response you got there.

HANS VON SPONECK: Thank you. Thank you very much. First of all, Denis Halliday was a colleague of mine, I have known him for many many years, three decades. He resigned, he briefed me, we spent a day together in Geneva, and I thought, but naively, that here was a man who, after 13 months, was simply tired. It is very taxing to be in Iraq, psychologically also. So I thought here I could take over, with fresh air in my lungs, and manage a program as best as I could, and at the time I was not aware how inadequate this program was, as I've described it to you. So I approached this with naiveness, but very quickly realized what really, were some of the reasons for Mr. Halliday to resign. And I think today as we sometimes travel together, we are seen where we -- our interpretation of the inadequacy is the same. We feel strongly that we were misled, and the reasons for our resignations don't differ very much.

Have I been invited? Yes. I attended, twice, congressional hearings in Washington, and found a very sympathetic group, but very small, of five and six members of Congress who convened a meeting to hear us. And you know that there was a letter of 70 congress members to President Clinton to ask him to consider lifting of sanctions. I think the additive effect that makes a political difference isn't there yet. But Washington, in Washington are, in the Congress, absolutely -- or were, I don't know the new Congress -- voices of support. I've seen quite a few, including Jim McDermott here in Washington and others, and talked and found an immense amount of sympathy. But the congresspeople are so overwhelmed by so many other issues that Iraq doesn't have maybe the prominence on the agenda as in my view it should have.

I would encourage members of Congress, and I have encouraged Jim McDermott, to go and see for himself. There's been only one single US Congressman who went to Iraq, that was Tony Hall, a Democrat from Ohio. He has been there, and has changed his picture. So I hope there will be more Congressional hearings with more members of the US Congress in the period ahead. I have suggested that.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You mentioned that when you originally heard about the smart sanctions, that you were optimistic, or hopeful that this would be an improvement. What would a smart sanctions look like to you that would be a major improvement and yet would still address the supposed concerns that the US and Britain have about the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?

HANS VON SPONECK: Thank you. That's a good question. I would say it's a bit late, after 11 years, to begin with smart sanctions. And we should have much earlier targeted these sanctions on those who we believe are the perpetrators of what has happened in Iraq. Visa restrictions, financial restrictions, travel restrictions in general, all this would have been helpful, to make a point. The most helpful smart sanctions to me would be the enforcement, a very strict enforcement, of military sanctions, of blocking the import of weaponry and blocking potential sellers from selling the weapons. That to me would be the smart thing to do.

We didn't do that. We were totally dishonest. Had you come to the Jordanian/Iraqi border as often as I did, driving back and forth, you would have seen two lanes: one lane where humanitarian supplies went for inspection, and another lane with more trucks often, where there was no inspection. This was known to the US Intelligence community, and nothing is done about it.

The trucks went simply into Iraq, and the trucks that carried the obvious -- humanitarian supplies -- were subjected to controls -- while the other trucks could go in free. But this was deliberate. It was deliberate because if you don't have a villain in Baghdad, you have lost your entire basis for a Middle East Gulf policy. No geostrategic justification to have military and arms in that area or to export weaponry into Saudi Arabia -- today Saudi Arabia has a liquidity problem. That rich country has run out of resources, out of money. Why? Because -- it reminds me of Churchill, who said "How many more times do you need the capacity to destroy a house?" They are the most -- the Middle East is the most over-armed part of the world today.

So I think a strict enforcement of a military embargo -- no hidden agenda. Let's have an honest agenda of control, and I think we'll see an improvement.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. von Sponeck, first off, thank you very much. But I'd like to urge you to be careful about the word "we" as in arms limitations and all these things. I would urge all of us, and anyone who really cares, to acknowledge that our government, and the Republican and the Democratic Party have been hijacked, and most of our state governments, hijacked by corporations. They don't listen to us -- I call it like trying to swim through molasses. And I think if we're going to -- I have one and a half questions, by the way. The half question is kind of rhetorical: how do we get a system like we have in Germany and it's not winner take all, and we wind up not being represented. I think we need to get the public airways back, and I think we need a radical overhaul of campaign finance, so that we get representation. And you can answer that if you want, it's somewhat of a rhetorical question, I think it almost answers itself.

The real question I have is -- and refresh my memory, it's hard for me to keep track, they're doing so many horrible things, Iraq is not the only place here or there. United Nations: is there any way that other countries can override that Security Council? Because if not, then I have little regard for the United Nations, because it's just useless. Well, not totally useless -- there's no democracy there. [Applause.]

HANS VON SPONECK: Thank you. The clapping makes me sad, because I was in the UN, and I believe in the UN, and as somebody said, if it didn't exist, we would have to invent it. But because globalization means, we need a body that can handle these issues. Yes, there is a way. The supreme body in the UN is the Security Council. That Security Council can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the UN General Assembly. And what some of us are trying hard, but with little success so far, is to make the UN Security Council on issues like the Iraq issues accountable to the International Court of Justice, in the Hague. That would be a very good way to make sure that 15 governments are not holding a global community hostage, year after year, by having judiciary people and legal people -- that is not possible under the present rules of the game. The court of justice can only come in if, for example the U.S. and Iraq would agree to bring an issue before that body. Since that isn't ever going to be the case, the body doesn't come in, and the Security Council, it's a horrible bureaucratic phrase, by the way, it says, "as long as the UN Security Council is seized of the matter, no other body can deal with it unless the General Assembly overrules." And you try, out of 189 member countries, to try a two-thirds majority.

There is so much bribery involved. I remind you-- sorry, I'm a bit long here, but I would just want to -- I'm reminded by what James Baker wrote in his memoirs when he describes how these resolutions on sanctions against Iraq came about. He said 'We first tried to influence our friends to make them agree. When that failed, we exerted pressure. When that failed, we intensified pressure, and when that failed, we started bribing.' And I keep saying I admire Mr. Baker for his candor; I despise him for the content of his candor. [Applause]

But you had an earlier question on proportional representation as we have it in Germany, it would be a good system, because it captures the lesser votes very nicely. But I am --- I don't think I have any influence on that subject, as far as the US is concerned.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: [inaudible.]

HANS VON SPONECK: What can we expect from the new ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Negroponte. I don't know, but one good thing happened which impressed me, and that is that three weeks ago, Ambassador Negroponte took a letter from the U.S. government, and didn't send it, but went to his Iraqi counterpart, knocked on his door, this was on the weekend, and said, "I have a letter for you." And they sat together, they looked at the letter, and two days later the Iraqi ambassador went to the U.S. mission and gave a reply to Mr. Negroponte.

You see, this kind of approach will make all the difference in the world. When we start taking each other into account, face to face, rather than flying with a B-52 where we don't even see our enemies, I think everything becomes more human. So that I liked. And maybe this will be beginning of a dialogue with the other side. So that's my very, very small experience -- I don't know Mr. Negroponte, but I thought this was a very fine, nice gesture.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm not sure if you can answer this, but having worked with in development, and having worked with the UN and in Iraq and the U.S., what can you say about the importance of aid, and cooperation between states and aid agencies. And this is very prevalent today, as we have humanitarian crisis both in Iraq and parts of Africa and in Afghanistan, and this lack of cooperation between governments. And I wonder if you could speak a little bit to that, the importance of that.

HANS VON SPONECK: Well, let's, if you don't mind, I'll just start at the end of the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War, it was you, the U.S., who gave us Marshall Plan assistance. When we lost the war in Germany, you came with massive Marshall Plan assistance. When Iraq lost the Gulf War, it got sanctions, ladies and gentlemen. Why? Because we got rid of our Hitler, and they hadn't gotten rid of their Saddam Hussein. Punishment.

So. Let's take it further. I would say today, at the end of the Cold War, we became -- the western nations, led by you -- we became the wealthiest misers on the block. We have the money, but if we look today at how this money is coming forward, it's shrinking from year to year. Far removed from what the UN has proposed as a minimum contribution, as a percentage of the gross national product of each nation. We have to become again more compassionate. And even if it's just for pragmatic reasons, I hope it isn't, but we have to give to reduce poverty, and if we do that, I think we make the first significant steps to reduce conditions of the kind that we have seen which are leading in that same form to something like the 11th of September.

Don't be mistaken when you read these are all kids and young men and women -- no women -- from well-to-do backgrounds. But, yes, but they needed undercarriage, and the undercarriage is one of destitution, of poverty, of misery. And if we have that, then we shouldn't be surprised if things don't go the way they should.

So I'm making a big pitch for human security, as I said in the beginning, as distinct from military security. And that means investment in people, trying to do something for women, women's rights. Where we've done that, life is better. You can see it in different parts of the world. I'm familiar with India. In certain parts of India where there was investment in women, tension reduced and life became more peaceful. So human security is ten times preferable to military security. [Applause.]

[End.]

 

 

Transcript posted on 21 December 2001.


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